In settings where most workers have full-time schedules, hourly wages are appropriate primary indicators of job quality and worker outcomes. However, in sectors where full-time schedules do not dominateprimarily service-producing activities-total hours matter, in addition to hourly wages, for job quality and worker outcomes. In this paper we employ a sector-focused, comparative framework to further examine hours levels-measured as average weekly hours-and trends in Canada, the United States, and Mexico. We analyze the retail sector, which is of interest because of its high rate of part-time employment in the U.S. Based on our fieldwork in the United States and Mexico and qualitative literature on Canadian retail work, we argue that the combination of business strategies and very different institutional constraints will lead U.S. retailers to a greater extent and Canadian retailers to a lesser extent to shorten hours and expand part-time jobs, whereas in Mexico it will lead retailers to lengthen hours. We apply this argument to predictions about differences in levels and trends. Drawing on standard public data sources from the three countries, we compare means and run time series regressions to estimate trends net of cyclical effects. Results broadly support our predictions, especially the distinction between the United States and Canada on the one hand and Mexico on the other. We provide additional context for these findings. JEL Classification Codes: D22, J22, J23, J81, L81, P52
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Short Hours, Long Hours: Hour Levels and Trends in the Retail Industry in the United States, Canada, and Mexico
In settings where most workers have full-time schedules, hourly wages are appropriate primary indicators of job quality and worker outcomes. However, in sectors where full-time schedules do not dominate-primarily service-producing activities-total hours matter, in addition to hourly wages, for job quality and worker outcomes.
Involuntary part-time employment is one gauge of the extent to which short hours pose a problem. As of January 2012, 5.2 percent of the civilian labor force was working part-time but wanted full-time work (BLS 2012) , though it is important to keep in mind that involuntary parttime work has a strong cyclical component (for example, it stood at 3.2 percent in January 2008).
Involuntary part-time employment does not capture the full extent of the problem: part-timers could need or want more hours while wishing to remain part-time; full-timers could also desire more work hours. More expansive measures of hours insufficiency are rare, but in a 1985 supplement to the Current Population Survey, 27.5 percent of those employed expressed a preference for working longer hours, even at the same hourly rate of pay. Not surprisingly, this preference was more marked among those working under 15 hours (44.5 percent) as well as those working 15 to 29 hours (37.0 percent) (Shank 1986 ).
In examining U.S. unemployment over the past few decades, one important window has been comparison with other countries, particularly Western Europe, with particular emphasis on how national institutions have shaped job quantity and to what extent there is a job quality-job quantity tradeoff (Howell et al. 2007; OECD 1994) . Again, however, there has been limited cross-national comparison of hours of work and how hours levels are set; perhaps the most prominent hours literature has consisted of debates on how annual hours have evolved in various countries (Ausubel and Grübler 1995; Bell and Freeman 2001; Schor 1991 ; but also see Houseman and Nakamura 2001; Tilly 1996; Wong and Picot 2001) . These debates have centered on comparisons of the United States with Western European countries, which have distinct constellations of labor market institutions. Another body of literature, more policy-focused, has examined policy tools (such as short-time compensation) that substitute (and subsidize) hours adjustment for headcount adjustment (Abraham and Houseman 1993, 2009 ).
In this paper we employ a comparative framework to further examine hours levels and trends. We take as a point of departure that the incentives shaping the setting of hours and the consequent level of hours differ by sector: for example, retail, finance, construction, and manufacturing all follow different patterns of part-time employment (Tilly 1996) . In order to simplify the analysis and permit concordance of quantitative and qualitative data, we analyze the retail sector. Retail is far from representative of other sectors; it is of interest precisely because of its high rate of part-time employment and because large U.S. retailers have moved toward adoption of just-in-time staffing systems (Carré and Tilly 2007; Tilly 1996) . Thus, it is a sector where nonstandard (and indeed variable) working hours are the norm.
In particular, we characterize retail operations as entailing staffing and scheduling practices that generate an hours pattern that differs markedly from the economy-wide averagethough it is shared with some other services. Retail businesses are characterized by the need for long and-as a corollary-nonstandard hours of operation. The goal of providing customer convenience through extended hours of operation prevails. The timing of the extension of hours of operation, for both Sunday opening and late-night hours, varies in the United States and Canada, as will be discussed. In Mexico's modern retail, long opening hours are partly inherited from the practices of small shops. The implications of long and expanding opening hours are clear. Long and nonstandard opening hours create two managerial goals or needs. The first is to control labor costs, and the second is to manage staffing levels by means of labor deployment, in particular scheduling. We shall argue that in the United States and Canada, this pair of goals leads retailers to expand part-time jobs and shorten hours, whereas in Mexico it leads them to lengthen hours. We attribute the differences among the three countries chiefly to distinct institutional configurations.
We have previously compared U.S. retail jobs with those in a number of Western European countries, though that research did not examine hours in much detail (Carré et al. 2010 ). Here, we choose to compare the United States with its North American neighbors, Canada and Mexico. These countries are in close proximity and share many of the same retail chains; for example, Wal-Mart is the largest retailer in both the United States and Mexico and is one of the top retailers in Canada as well. Importantly for the comparison, formal retailers share similar market strategies in all three countries, and in particular, Wal-Mart is a major driver of market change in each of the settings. Nonetheless, as we shall explore in some detail, the labor market institutions of the three countries are quite distinct, with important implications for hours of work. We have the advantage of having conducted qualitative fieldwork in the United States and Mexico; we also take advantage of a small but growing case-study literature on retail work in Canada. Retail food is the largest segment of retail employment, hence the qualitative data are strongest for retail food. So, in addition to considering data for retail as a whole, we zoom in on the retail food sector in each of the three countries.
We adopt an analytical approach that compares hours levels and hours trends, based on the supposition that the same institutional effects play out on the level of hours as on the trend of hours. We adopt two axes of comparison. We start with a baseline sectoral comparison, comparing hours in the retail sector as a whole, and in retail food in particular, to the total The exposition proceeds as follows. We start by describing how labor market institutions and retail strategies function in each of the three countries, drawing on fieldwork and secondary literature. This leads first of all to predictions about differences in hours levels across the three countries, and between retail and the rest of the economy within each country. Next we examine the actual differences in levels.
We then reason from these analyses to adduce hypotheses about how the same mechanisms are likely to affect trends. Again, there is one set of hypotheses about how retail differs from the rest of the economy, and a second set about cross-national differences. We turn next to trends for the United States and Canada, to examine whether these hypotheses are borne out. Finally, given much more limited data for Mexico, we separately consider evidence regarding trends in that country. We close the paper with brief conclusions, including policy implications. (Jacobson 2006; Kainer 1999 Kainer , 2002 Skuterud 2005; Zeytinoglu et al. 2004 ).
Two final notes before launching into the findings: First, we are continuing to analyze the U.S. and Mexican qualitative data, so this paper draws on interim qualitative findings. Second, this paper deploys many dimensions of comparison. We compare hours levels and trends-both of the economy as a whole and of two specific sectors-across three countries. We have tried to minimize the risk of sinking into extraneous detail by emphasizing broad patterns and significant deviations from those patterns. This approach leaves some results unexplained but is motivated by an attempt to render the results intelligible and manageable.
HOW STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS SHAPE WORK HOURS
We return here to the question of how retailers control labor costs and deployment, and how this process differs in different institutional contexts. We first describe commonalities of the United States and Canadian cases and then turn to differences between the three countries-the Mexican case is sufficiently distinct that it is best understood in the context of that comparison.
In U.S. and Canadian retail, labor cost control is achieved first through control of unit labor cost. This involves paying part-time workers lower hourly rates, rationing part-timers' benefit access, and controlling entry-level and ceiling wage rates. Given the lower cost of parttime workers, retailers also cover a large proportion of staffing with part-timers.
This set of strategies presupposes a permissive set of institutions. Retailers use the fulltime/part-time distinction as a legally and normatively acceptable way to exclude a large group of employees from the standard wage level and full benefit package. The distinction has become a status distinction that may have little to do with actual hours worked. A human resources officer at a U.S. grocery chain we will call Value Fresh noted, "There's probably plenty of 30-plus-hours part-time employees that just are not full-time because the stores are not able to make anybody wholesale full-time if they want to, because of the expense of the benefit packages."
Retailers achieve the control of total labor costs through the control of labor deployment-that is, through achieving a close coupling of worker hours with customer flow while maintaining minimum adequate staffing levels. Ultimately for store managers, in the short and medium term, controlling total labor costs amounts to controlling labor hours. In the United
States and Canada, where standard full-time workweeks are 37 to 40 hours, control of total labor cost is achieved in two ways: 1) with the use of part-time workers, some of whom who can flex up to 40 hours (and have lower unit cost); and 2) in some cases, with relatively low guaranteed hours for full-timers (32 to 35 hours) who can also flex up. Retailers can meet several costcontrol goals this way: a close match of staffing with customer flow over time, avoidance of the overtime premium when hours must be flexed upward, and the ability to reduce hours to achieve savings at short notice. Again, labor market institutions shape this set of strategies: in particular, the overtime premium and the legitimacy of unilateral, real-time management decisions to alter an individual's work hours (not present in some European countries, as Carré et al. [2010] have pointed out).
The control of unit cost and the control of total hours obviously are mutually reinforcing.
But as we study retail over the past 30 years (from the 1980s on), it is the control exerted over the labor deployment pattern in order to control total labor costs that singles out the retail sector relative to the economy as a whole, at least in the United States and Canada. In U.S. retail fieldwork, executives and managers reported increasing use of part-time workers and shortening of the minimum guaranteed hours of full-time workers. In Canada, research from Ontario (Canada's largest province) showed significant hours cuts in unionized retail food, driven by management demands (Kainer 1999 (Kainer , 2002 States earn it the term constrained flexibility. Mexico has among the world's strongest labor market regulations on paper. But these regulations are enforced selectively (Cook [2007] argues that Mexico's system should be considered a "nonenforcement regime," which we view as an overstatement), and a majority of the economy falls within unregulated small or informal enterprises. Hence, unevenly regulated dualism best describes Mexico's situation.
We identify two key reasons why hours flexibility in Canada may be more constrained (Kainer 1999 (Kainer , 2002 Tilly 1996 ) and in our own U.S. fieldwork, unions have resisted hours reductions and expansion of part-time work in these two countries.
Other aspects of the Canadian institutional setting may have mitigated the need for large numbers of low-wage stockers with short hours; at least in Ontario, there is no mandate for individual product labeling, a mandate that, in the United States, seems to have fostered heavy use of short-hour part-time stock clerks (to attach or change prices).
Unlike the case in the United States and Canada, Mexico's institutions motivate businesses in general, and retailers in particular, to set longer hours. First, Mexico regulates hours through a wage premium on overtime, as in the United States and Canada, but the premium only takes effect at 48 hours. While some industries have adopted a shorter workweek, our fieldwork, and our review of union contracts from three Mexican states and the Federal District, demonstrate that the 48-hour week consisting of six 8-hour days is the standard in formal Mexican retail. A standard 48-hour workweek raises the average number of hours and also makes it relatively easy to cover Saturdays and Sundays (simply by staggering six-day schedules) without use of part-time workers. Second, Mexico's minimum wage sets a daily minimum. For jobs that pay the minimum wage or close to it, as many retail jobs do, there is no advantage to having workers cover just a few peak hours per day, because the employer must pay the daily minimum regardless of the number of hours. Indeed, contractual wage rates in general are set by the day. Third, employer-provided health and pension benefits are relatively rare in Mexico; most Mexicans depend on the inadequate and uneven but nonetheless nearly universal government-provided systems (Levy 2008) . Avoiding benefit payments is not a major consideration for employers, which removes another motivation for creating part-time jobs in the United States and Canada.
Thus, the key incentives for businesses, and retailers in particular, to shorten hours in the United States and Canada are absent in Mexico. Moreover, given that pay is set by the day, there is an economic incentive for employers to press workers to work longer while paying the contractual daily wage. Retail fieldwork in Mexico indicates that, in fact, retailers do save on labor costs by extending worker hours: it appears to be common for stores to require workers to work added hours without pay, despite the fact that the law mandates overtime pay for such Kainer [2002, p. 180]) , but it appears to be far less common; our U.S. fieldwork (which involved a larger number of interviews, especially of workers) uncovered no instances of it. Mexican unions provide little defense against this type of stretch-out, because contratos de protección ("protection" or "sweetheart" contracts that make few demands on employers) are widespread in Mexican workplaces, and in retail in particular (Tilly 2009; Tilly and Álvarez Galván 2006) .
This line of argument posits that some legal requirements bind more than others in Mexico: employers are more likely to violate the legal requirement to pay for all hours worked than the requirement to pay the minimum daily wage. This supposition is certainly consistent with our retail fieldwork: there were numerous reports of unpaid extra hours, and no reports of contractual wages below the statutory minimum. It also makes sense, since there is a written record of contractual wages in employment contracts and payroll records, whereas there is no built-in record-keeping of extra work hours in retail establishments. Also contributing to the incentive to dodge overtime payments is a high premium of 100 percent (i.e., double time) up to 57 hours, and 200 percent beyond that point.
There are two reasons to think that hours extension may be more extreme in A final point about Mexico is that family businesses, self-employment (including street vendors), and informal enterprises are far more common in that country. Even at autoservicios, the modern hypermarkets that increasingly blanket urban Mexico, baggers and parking lot helpers work strictly for tips. Though we will focus our attention on employees, Mexico's Economic Census allows us to contrast employees with a broader set of workers who include proprietors, unpaid family members, and other unpaid workers. We expect that many in this group, as well, work long hours in order to achieve a target income despite low hourly earnings. 2) Definition of the total economy. U.S. and Mexican data report on "All private"; Canada gives numbers for "Total," including the public sector.
FINDINGS: LEVELS
3) Definitions of food retailers. Mexican data report on "Food, beverage, and tobacco stores" and "Food retailing in supermarkets, hypermarkets, and warehouse stores,"
which we have combined to approximate grocery.
4) Data source. Some Mexican data come from the ENE, which is a household survey, and some from the Economic Census, which is an employer survey. hours per day than all but Japan and Korea). This is true for the ENE data that include small, family, and informal businesses, but also for the Economic Census data that are limited to employees. The U.S. generally has the shortest weekly hours, but Canada comes in shorter in the grocery sector. This accords with our expectations, except for the fact that in Canada grocery workers have shorter hours. Understanding this unexpected result involves trends as well as levels, so we put off discussion of it for the Trends section.
An interesting indication that (on average) Mexican businesses press less-powerful employees to work longer hours, whereas U.S. businesses impose shorter hours, emerges from comparing the nonsupervisory category with all employees (which includes supervisors and managers). In the United States, weekly hours are longer in the broader category, which resonates with our fieldwork finding that retail managers work extremely long hours. In Mexico, weekly hours are longer for line employees than for managers.
FURTHER PREDICTIONS, MODELS, AND REGRESSION RESULTS
Further Predictions
The analytical framework that led to our expectations about hour levels, largely confirmed by data, also points to some predictions for likely patterns in the time trend of hours by country and sector.
We foresee two main types of effects that are likely to affect hours trends:
1) Institutional shift effects. We have argued that institutions alter the incentives for using part-time work (for example, employer-based health coverage, or a daily minimum wage) and in some cases directly impede hours reductions (for example, through union bargaining power). To the extent that these institutions shift in nature or strength, we would expect employers to set hours differently.
2) Competitive squeeze effects. When price competition intensifies, bringing with it reduced sales, there is pressure on employers not just to reduce variable costs in step with sales, but to reduce per-unit variable costs. A U.S. retail example would be cutting costs by replacing a full-timer with two part-timers, each earning a lower hourly wage and a minimal benefit package.
2 Two other types of effects are chiefly cyclical, but to the extent there are long-term trends toward slower or faster growth, they may also influence trends:
1) Demand effects. During a downturn, when there is less demand, less staffing is needed, and one margin for decreasing staffing is that of hours reductions.
2) Stagnation squeeze effects. Stagnation may duplicate the competitive squeeze effects in driving businesses to reduce unit costs. In addition, slack labor markets
give employers more leverage to induce workers to work schedules they might not accept at other times.
Although we have separated out the effect of changes in institutions, it is important to reiterate that institutions will also shape how demand and stagnation squeeze effects play out.
We expect that trends will particularly be influenced by institutional shift effects. The increased [Weil 2008 ], but the level of enforcement has declined [Bernhardt et al. 2008] ). At the same time, retail competition has heightened with the entry of big-box and on-line retailers, including cross-border movements by giants like Wal-Mart and Amazon (Planet Retail 2008) . In this context, we expect that workers will be more exposed to employer cost-reduction strategies.
Hence, we predict a trend toward decreasing weekly hours in the United States and Canada, and a trend toward increasing weekly hours in Mexico. We expect that the same forces that have kept hours higher in Canada than in the United States might lead to delayed or slower reductions in hours in the former country.
Finally, Mexico is a special case within our trio of countries because economic growth has lagged behind workforce growth for more than two decades. This long-term stagnation is not adequately captured by unemployment figures, because in the absence of an unemployment insurance system, Mexicans can ill afford to stay unemployed and typically will move into informal or self-employment rather than remain jobless. But this means that a shift toward slower growth, which in the context of the United States and Canada we think of as a short-run cyclical phenomenon, in present-day Mexico also has the character of a long-run trend. This suggests that institutional shift effects may be joined by stagnation squeeze effects (less so by demand effects, which are more short-run) in driving a trend toward longer working hours.
Models
To evaluate trend patterns in U.S. and Canadian data, we run simple autoregressive time series models of the form:
where
• y t = ln(h t ) , the log of average weekly hours; 3
• x t takes two forms. In specifications with unemployment as the main regressor, x t = u t , the economy-wide unemployment rate. In specifications with change in GDP as the main regressor, x t = ln(GDP t / GDP t-1 ), the first difference of the log of inflationadjusted economy-wide GDP.
• Unemployment equations use monthly data, whereas GDP equations use quarterly data (since GDP data are only available quarterly).
• Z is a vector of seasonal dummies; we ran specifications with and without seasonal controls, but we only report the specifications without controls, for reasons discussed below.
• t is a time trend.
• The specification includes two lagged values each of x and y. 4 We ran separate regressions for total employment,
5
Sources for weekly hours are given in Table 1 , and the same sources were used for headcount. Table 2 subsector data were only available from 1990 forward). We made two choices with regard to specification that merit further explanation. First, we chose to regress the log of hours, rather than the first difference of the log of hours, on the first difference of log GDP. We made this choice for three reasons: 1) because GDP growth rate is analogous to unemployment in capturing the state of the business cycle at a given point in time; 2) because although GDP can grow indefinitely, weekly hours are constrained above and below; and 3) because using a first-differenced dependent variable would have meant not estimating a time trend in the GDP equations. 4 The adjusted R2 indicated only very small contributions to explanatory power (on the order of 0.01 in added adjusted R2) from additions of further lags of y or the x variables. 5 As noted above, because of data availability, "Total" was a true total in Canada, whereas "All private" was a true total in the United States.
Second, we chose to report results without seasonal controls as our preferred specification. Since we are interested in hours trends net of changes in GDP growth rate, whether those changes are seasonal, cyclical, or secular, it makes sense to omit seasonal controls.
However, we note that adding seasonal controls does weaken estimates of time trend effects in the GDP equations.
6 Table 3 shows time-trend results from the regressions. The results are discussed in succeeding sections. 
Regression Results
FINDINGS: TIME TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Regarding time trends over the period 1987-2009 (1990-2009 for retail food), we expected the institutional shift effect to lead to a trend toward lower average hours in both countries. At least in retail, the cross-national differences in institutional strength led us to expect U.S. hours reductions to outpace Canadian ones. However, the unexpectedly short hours in Canadian grocery stores (discussed in the "Findings: Levels" section) pointed to a possible flaw in this logic.
Referring to Table 3 , we find pervasive downward trends in average weekly hours. Both U.S. and Canadian trend coefficients are negative and significant, in both types of hours models (those with unemployment and those with GDP), across "Total employment," "Retail," and "Retail food." The magnitudes are not negligible. In models estimating weekly hours as a function of unemployment rate and as a time trend, U.S. retail shows a time series coefficient of -0.000027, corresponding to a reduction of 0.2 weekly hours over 20 years. Canada's coefficient of -0.0003 ("Retail") corresponds to a reduction of 1.8 hours over 20 years. When GDP growth is substituted for unemployment, estimated coefficients predict similar reductions of 0.4 hours in the United States and 2.5 hours in Canada. We focus here on sectoral and especially crossnational differences.
Within-Country Sectoral Differences
In both countries, within-country sectoral differences are small and variable across specifications. In the United States, the trend effects are negative and somewhat higher for grocery and for total private employment than for retail. Earlier numbers from the 1960s onward indicate that weekly hours economy-wide have declined over the long haul (Kirkland 2000) . As likely sources of decline, observers point to compositional changes in employment-the growth of hospitality/restaurant, retail, and diverse kinds of personal services-sectors with numerous short hour/part-time jobs. Retail hours were lower than economy-wide averages in the early 1960s and have subsequently declined further, though not at faster rates than average. 7 Similarly, in Canada the trend effect is negative economy-wide and in subsectors; in this case the economy as a whole shows the strongest downward trends.
Cross-National Differences-Canada and the United States
The Canadian trend effects are larger than those for the United States across sectors and in both specifications (with one exception, for "Total" in the GDP specification). Canadian For retail as a whole and retail food in particular, we propose that Canadian retailers have adopted labor deployment responses similar in nature to U.S. ones but different in timing and degree. Canadian retailer strategies mirror those of U.S. retailers in many ways, because Canadian retailers too have had to adjust to market saturation, growing suburban sprawl, and the spread of inventory and supply-chain management technologies that tend to be adopted earlier by, and give a competitive edge to, large chains. However, the timing and depth of adoption of cost-cutting and scheduling practices differed.
A number of features of retail operations that are long-standing in the United States were fully implemented later in Canada-during our period of analysis , as compared to before its inception, as was the case in the United States. For example, part-time schedules (under 30 weekly hours) grew in the 1980s but began to be used more systematically in morerecent years than in the United States. Furthermore, Canada adopted long hours of operation later and allowed seven-day operation later than did the United States. In both countries, longer hours of operation have tended to generate the need for large numbers of workers assigned short shifts (and overall short part-time hours) as well as a requirement for workers to be exposed to variable and unpredictable schedules. Canada only began to deregulate opening hours starting in the late 1980s, and Ontario, Quebec, and most other large Canadian provinces only legalized Sunday opening in the 1990s (Kainer 2002, p. 145; Skuterud 2005 Skuterud , p. 1957 . In contrast, Sunday opening has been ubiquitous in the United States in most states since the 1980s (Tilly 1996) .
Beyond opening hours deregulation, other changes in industry structure and pressure occurred later than in the United States. For retail food and general merchandise, "the Wal-Mart effect"-that is, severe price competition that is also nonunion-hit later in Canada. In the early to mid-1980s, warehouse stores and megastores grew rapidly (Kainer 2002, p. 147 has put sharp pressure on unions to grant supermarket chains concessions on wage levels, job structures (fulltime/part-time ratios), and givebacks on employer-sponsored benefits. (Wal-Mart itself has successfully opposed unionization drives and has so far remained union-free.) During the 1990s, at the grocery chains where unions were already in place, management engaged in very forceful efforts to reopen contracts, seeking to win concessions in collective bargaining agreements and to dissolve pattern bargaining (e.g., by obtaining different contract end dates across chains).
Most detailed accounts come from industry bargaining in Ontario, Canada's most populous province (Kainer 1999 (Kainer , 2002 Zeytinoglu et al. 2004 ). These accounts note that management efforts at grocery chains were successful. Changes have been drastic in unionized chains; they occurred over a few years in the 1990s and were paralleled in nonunion chains. Kainer notes that the contractual changes brought shorter hours for both full-timers and part-timers, while increasing the part-time percentage.
In short, we conclude that similar changes in industry practices have taken place in both countries but that in Canada, at least in retail food, change came later, and that it moved faster once it did come. Because the time series used here starts in 1987 and covers a period of significant change in Canadian retail, estimated Canadian hours declines are steeper than for the United States.
Still, this does not fully explain why the Canadian grocery workers' hours average over the full period is lower than that for U.S. grocery workers, especially in light of the fact that, as of 2007, Canadian grocery work hours were higher than grocery work hours in the United States.
A glance at the actual grocery work hours time series for the two countries (Figures 1 and 2) suggests an intriguing pattern: the United States and Canada started out at similar points, but Canadian hours fell gradually over the entire period, whereas U.S. hours trended upward slightly until 2003 and then deteriorated sharply. 2003 is also the year of the massive Southern California grocery strike, which shifted contract terms in a manner that was unfavorable to workers, arguably marking a turning point for U.S. retail food workers overall. Thus, though Sunday opening hours and the spread of big boxes came earlier to the United States, Canadian grocers may have preceded their U.S. counterparts in aggressively assaulting unions. This pattern calls for additional analysis. 
FINDINGS: TIME TREND IN MEXICO
As we noted earlier, Mexico trend data sources are limited to only a few data points.
Additionally, the ENE allows us to look at working hours for all classes of workers combined (employees combined with the self-employed and others), while the Economic Census provides hours for employees separately; each data set provides useful information. As a result, we draw comparisons across years within data sources. We also caution at the outset that in the case of Mexico, variable data quality over time and changing variable definitions and even sampling frames over time render comparisons over time a bit risky in general (Rendón 2003) .
The limited number of observations also makes it difficult to separate cyclical from trend effects. To address this limitation, we try to compare hours in different years of relatively brisk growth with each other and hours in years of sluggish growth with each other to get at trends.
Regarding trends, we expected that both institutional shift effects (weakening unions, reduced government enforcement of protective regulations) and squeeze effects (triggered by long-term economic stagnation) would tend to drive a trend toward longer hours, both economywide and in retail. Since our thesis is based in large part on employers compelling workers to work extra hours without pay, the expectation that these changes will show up in the data assume that even unpaid extra hours will be reported, a proposition that seems more plausible for the household-reported ENE than for the employer-reported Economic Census. For self-employment and family businesses, as well, we expected squeeze effects to push hours up over the long run.
Trend for 1991 to 2000-All Workers
We examine trends by comparing pairs of earlier and later years that are cyclically similar. Using the ENE, we find evidence for a trend increase in hours, as expected. Average weekly hours for employees and self-employed workers grew from 41 to 44 hours between 1991 and 2000, two years that are in upswings and thus comparable. Retail hours also grew, from 43 to 45 hours. These numbers represent noteworthy increases. We are not able, for those years, to tease out work hours of wage employees (mostly in formal firms) from those of the selfemployed. Therefore, hours increases could be taking place primarily among the self-employed.
Still, we expect that it is during economic downturns that the self-employed are most likely to increase their hours, and these two years are up-cycle years. Moreover, examination of data from the Economic Census (not shown) shows hours for employees and the self-employed moving in the same direction. 
Trend for 2003 to 2008-Wage Employees
However, Economic Census data show an unexpected decline in hours over time. hours. Similarly, hours for retail food employees declined from 58 to 53 over these two years.
We have more confidence in these numbers because they cover wage workers exclusively.
In sum, preliminary findings on trends for 1991-2008, a period that includes both faster and slower years, do not point to a clear trend, contrary to our predictions. Hours go up, then down. Conceivably, the trend could be stability in work hours, a result that would be congruent with the institutional regulation of work schedules (primarily long standard weeks). If we focus only on the results from the Economic Census that tell us the most about formal retail, the trend-albeit only in recent years-would appear to be downward, the opposite of what we predicted.
CONCLUSION
Summarizing empirical results
We summarize our findings as follows. Regarding levels, we expected that hours would be lowest in the United States and highest in Mexico, economy-wide but particularly in retail.
We rested this expectation on salient institutional differences among the three countries; the effects of these institutional differences would play out disparately economy-wide and across sectors. Our analysis of the levels of weekly work hours over the 1987-2009 period largely confirms our expectations.
Beyond this national ranking, our findings on levels speak to the relation of retail hours to the economy-wide average. Retail hours are lower than the economy-wide average in Canada and the United States but higher than average in Mexico. We interpret this result as reflecting retail's distinctive strategies for control of labor costs and schedules.
In the results on trend effects, we did not find exactly what we predicted. We did find a negative time trend in retail hours in the United States and Canada, reflecting retailers' zealous pursuit of cost reduction strategies in the context of weakening worker-protection institutions, notably retail unions. However, we predicted a stronger time trend in the United States, based on our characterization of the U.S. system as highly permissive of hours reductions, but found instead that the trend is stronger in Canada. As we discussed, the time period 1987-2009 likely captured a time of rapid change in retail staffing patterns in Canada, in a direction parallel to U.S. changes (which came earlier, and then once more gained force in the mid-2000s).
In Mexico, where unique institutions direct retail strategy toward lengthening hours, we predicted that the withering of protective institutions, along with long-run stagnation, would lead to a lengthening trend in hours. Mexican results are based on far less evidence than in the United
States and Canada. Evidence is mixed on whether hours are trending upward or downward over time.
We have a number of caveats about the analysis and results we present. First, the analysis of U.S. and Canadian trends refers to national-level patterns. But in fact there is variability in the timing-though not the direction-of regulatory change across states and provinces within each country (e.g., Skuterud 2005) . A more nuanced account could be developed with closer tracking of these changes at the state or provincial level. Second, specifically for Canada, we have a better understanding of the state of unionized food retail than of the state of discounters, franchises, and nonunion stores overall, simply because many of the published accounts have studied the erosion of working conditions in unionized stores in particular. However, we expect, if anything, that nonunion stores have implemented scheduling and structural changes faster.
Third, Mexico raises a number of thorny issues. The analysis of Mexican statistics is limited by data quality issues that are significant (Rendón 2003) . Also, the limited availability of time series data makes the analysis of trends tentative.
Substantively, the major structural change affecting Mexican retail in recent years is the steady shift toward larger, more modern, and more formal establishments (Álvarez Tilly and Álvarez Galván 2006) , a trend expected to continue and to affect worker outcomes. Here we do not address this issue because the paper focuses exclusively on employees (dependent employment), whereas the sector most affected by the modernizing trend consists of small/traditional family businesses with few or no wage employees. In order to maintain comparability with the United States and Canada, we focused on wage employment and overlooked this more dramatic trend.
Also, we do not fully understand a number of detailed patterns in Mexico, including the role of modern retail and whether its practices are migrating to other retail formats. Importantly, there may additionally be different staffing patterns within the sector of retail that hires most wage employees (formal retail, usually modern).
Fourth, we lack separate statistics for nonsupervisory workers in Canada. Average hours for the whole workforce reflect higher hours for managers. Similarly, trends in average hours may in part reflect changes in hours of managers and supervisors, especially in small retail outlets.
Despite some unexpected findings and a healthy-sized list of caveats, we believe the body of evidence presented here makes a strong case for the importance of national institutions in shaping the level and trend of weekly hours. While we noted from the outset that retail is in some ways an extreme case because of its particular needs to cover long opening hours and wide swings in customer flows, we believe a similar logic can be applied to other industries; the economy-wide results offer some support for this belief. These regularities point not only toward an understanding of how work schedules are set, but also toward possible levers for ameliorating this important dimension of job quality. We now examine some of these possibilities.
Policy Options: United States
Making a difference for retail workers entails shifting the hours regime and/or mitigating the consequences of job limitations for workers. Any policy change under consideration must take account of interactions among institutional factors, available workforces, and retailer competitive strategies.
In the United States, institutional features that historically had maintained hours levels and predictability-store hour restrictions and collective bargaining-have been removed or weakened. They have been partially undone in Canada and could conceivably be restored. For
Mexican retail workers, the most significant area in which to effect change is the enforcement of labor standards.
Several approaches might bring improvement for U.S. retail: instituting parity, or reducing differentials, in compensation between full-time and part-time workers; limiting store hours, or at least halting the ubiquitous pressure to move toward 24/7 operations; and compelling changes in business practices that would change decision terms for labor deployment.
Altering decision terms for store management would be most effectively achieved by reducing the substantial cost differentials between full-time and part-time workers, a change that would have to be effected through economy-wide policy changes. A floor of health insurance coverage would reduce this differential.
It is unclear, as of now, how the 2010 health insurance reform (the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act) will affect the cost differential between full-time and part-time workers and retailers' staffing decisions. A "large employer" mandate to cover full-time workers is scheduled to come into force in 2014; it would apply a penalty to the employer for each full-time worker who was not provided affordable health insurance and who relied on a tax credit to pay the premium under the individual mandate. The head count of how many full-time versus how many part-time workers a firm employs will not come into play in exempting employers from the mandate because a threshold of 50 full-time equivalents will define "large" employers. The full-time threshold of 30 or more weekly usual hours over the year may raise implementation issues for retailers who routinely schedule ostensibly "part-time" workers for over 30 hours on a week by week basis. (These issues are being raised in IRS technical releases.) It remains to be seen whether this clause compels de facto eligibility for these workers. Also to be seen is whether-with the gradual reduction of the full-time standard to as little as 32 hours among retailers-some retailers may simply assign the bulk of their workforce to usually scheduled hours below 30 in order to avoid providing coverage or paying the penalty. Currently, health coverage for full-timers is discretionary and thought to induce employee retention and commitment; once rendered a mandate, it may lose appeal as a human resource management tool. In this latter case, the mandate could be argued to foster short-hour (under 30) staffing practices.
Still, the universal-coverage goal of the reform lessens the deleterious implications of being part-time, relative to the prereform system, because part-timers will gain access to a health insurance floor through insurance exchanges and subsidies. At the same time, as an unintended consequence of this new alternative, the mandate may stunt an incipient trend among a few large retailers to cover part-timers in their company plan.
Like health insurance, mandated paid-time-off minima (e.g., sick time or vacation) would contribute to reducing the cost differential between part-time and full-time workers.
Also, given that entry-level retail wages are pegged at, or a bit above, the minimum wage, a higher real value of the minimum wage would also reduce incentives-as well as opportunities-to organize work and staff stores in ways heavily reliant upon large numbers of low-paid workers willing to flex up to 40 hours. Higher hourly wages may reduce worker availability to work extra hours on short notice, a labor supply effect. A higher minimum wage has decreasing ripple effects up the wage structure (Metcalf 2004; Wicks-Lim 2006) . Therefore, its effect is to compress the wage distribution, so it will likely contribute to reducing hourly cost differentials between entry-level part-timers and higher level full-timers.
The Mexican day-based minimum wage is a provocative notion to consider. Would having such a minimum wage make a difference in the use of part-time in the United States?
And, within a different context-that of seven-day operation and a 40-hour overtime standardwould it be feasible? Retail might be able to implement two kinds of minimum wages: an hourly and a daily wage, each suited for different settings. The notion of a daily minimum could also give rise to "show-up" pay practices whereby a minimum daily amount of hours/pay is notice. Although these requirements are breached regularly, practice remains a far cry from U.S.
short-term notification (Carré et al. 2010) . Also, French retail collective-bargaining agreements have set a minimum weekly hours limit of 26 hours. The agreement makes significant exceptions, and most cashiers work under that threshold. Yet the minimum acts as a deterrent; whereas in the United States 18 percent of retail workers usually work less than 15 hours per week and 34 percent work less than 20, in France only 10 percent and 16 percent, respectively, do so (Askenazy et al., forthcoming) .
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Of course, implementation of the approaches we suggest for the United States could also be achieved through collective bargaining, were union membership in the industry to grow, or to extend to newer retail formats such as big box stores.
Policy Options: Canada and Mexico
For Canada, policy goals should include finding means to slow, or possibly reverse, the convergence of the managerial model for work hours with the U.S. retail model. In practice, this would mean maintaining some of the institutional dimensions that have created "firewalls" between existing practices and a relentless race to reduce total labor costs. These institutional factors have included greater rates of collective bargaining coverage, minimum wages that have retained some value over time, and some policy questioning of 24-hour store opening times as well as differential compensation for holiday and weekend work.
In Mexico, effective enforcement of existing labor standards could potentially both improve formal retail jobs and "formalize" some informal jobs, thus possibly helping to raise standards for all workers. A combination of worker voices, administrative action, and reform of quasijudicial labor tribunals would be needed. Reform of labor laws to reduce direct government and company control over unions and support independent unions would significantly enhance the voice of the workers.
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On the administrative front, a Mexican federal government initiative to strengthen the inspection system that would mirror the Dominican Republic's system could have far-reaching effects. In the latter system, inspectors have scope over a wide variety of business regulations.
They work with employers, even providing technical assistance, to achieve compliance rather than rely on sanctions (Schrank and Piore 2007) . This combination needs to be coupled with a highly professional inspectorate and a government commitment to enforcement.
The last resort for Mexican (formal) workers to seek enforcement of labor laws is the tripartite Local Conciliation and Arbitration Tribunals. Belarmino (2011) and others propose replacing the structure, considered to be slanted against worker complaints, with a true judicial process that would be more independent. Such reform would provide another leverage point for meeting legal mandates.
Final Remarks
The motivation for conducting this research is that insufficient hours of work represent a chronic problem in the US retail sector and in other service work. The evidence strongly suggests that differences in labor market laws and other institutions help to explain short and shrinking hours of work in retail in the United States and Canada, and long work hours in Mexico. Thus, institutional changes may hold the potential to mitigate schedule-related problems in all three countries. Further consideration of these issues, and further use of international comparisons to understand them in more detail, can help researchers and policymakers to come up with feasible solutions to work-schedule problems in the three countries.
